Washington should not take European assistance for granted, especially if states cannot agree on how to label Beijing’s actions. In the event of a crisis, Europe remains less certain, with some governments demanding that China stop its actions while others call for restraint and dialogue. Officials are beginning to debate whether a specific operation constitutes an armed attack, what international law permits, and whether sanctions against China would be justified. Meanwhile, the effects on global trade are already starting to be felt as insurers raise premiums, shipping companies begin to reroute vessels, and financial markets react nervously.
When Washington asks its European allies to impose economic costs on Beijing, the answer could very likely be an attempt to win more time to determine what is happening. That delay could be precisely what Beijing is aiming to achieve: deliberate ambiguity, namely the systematic creation of legal and political uncertainty designed to make an adversary hesitate over how to respond. Elements of this approach have already been tested on Taiwan. In June 2026, Chinese coast guard vessels conducted patrols east of Taiwan, described by Beijing as lawful maritime enforcement, while Taiwan accused China of asserting jurisdiction over commercial shipping. The United States, Britain, France, and Germany subsequently expressed concern, but their protest remained at the level of rhetoric. Barely a week later, in July, Taiwan observed a sharp increase in Chinese coast guard and research vessel activities and publicly warned that such operations could be connected to preparations to disrupt maritime supply routes.
Even though such actions can be seen as acts of rehearsal, they cannot be interpreted as definitive proof that Beijing has undeniably decided to blockade Taiwan. They do, however, show how easily a future crisis could be presented in opposite ways by different sides, and how this difference could complicate a unified response between Washington and its allies. Washington should avoid the fallacy of assuming that because Europe is an ally with enormous collective economic power, that power will automatically be available as a coherent instrument in a crisis. It may not be. The United States should therefore be encouraging and, where necessary, nudging European governments to develop contingency plans before a crisis begins, precisely so that their institutional structure does not become an advantage for Beijing.
There is a structural reason why Europe could struggle to use its leverage quickly. The European project was built above all through economic integration—a common market, common rules, and, for much of the European Union, a common currency. Foreign and security policy evolved differently and remains largely in the hands of national governments. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy generally requires unanimity, as do the sanctions decisions that would be among the most important instruments available in a Taiwan crisis. This division matters because a blockade would sit precisely at the intersection of economic and foreign policy: European governments could agree that Taiwan’s security matters while disagreeing over whether Chinese actions constitute a sufficient trigger for collective economic measures. The European Parliament has already recognized the need for contingency planning, explicitly calling for preparations for scenarios including an economic blockade of Taiwan. But planning for a contingency is not the same thing as having a common response ready to deploy.
A blockade could therefore confront Washington with two crises at once: a crisis around Taiwan and a crisis within the coalition supporting Taiwan. Beijing could exploit these divisions by threatening restrictions against particular European countries or companies, using its monopoly on critical materials and rare earths as leverage, or offering selective economic incentives. The objective would be to make European governments reluctant to support measures that might trigger further retaliation. European governments are not abandoning the alliance—many continue to emphasize its importance—but they are increasingly preparing for a world in which U.S. priorities may shift more abruptly than in the past. In such an environment, a Taiwan crisis could arrive at precisely the wrong moment: when Washington expects Europe to follow its lead, some European governments may opt instead for asking how far they should go in assuming the economic and political costs of confronting China and of following the United States, in spite of the obvious fact that a Taiwan crisis would have direct consequences for Europe’s own security, economy, and strategic interests.
Europe and the world should prepare for such contingencies. In less than two years, Taiwan is scheduled to hold another presidential election on its regular four-year cycle, following the January 2024 election. This makes 2028 a useful planning horizon, since a new government in Taipei could produce renewed tensions with Beijing, depending on its policies and Beijing’s reaction. The point is not to predict that a crisis will occur in 2028, but to ensure that Washington and its European allies do not discover the limits of their respective contingency plans only after a new political configuration in Taiwan has already raised tensions. Therefore, the United States and its European allies should privately work through concrete scenarios—prolonged inspections of commercial vessels, selective denial of port access, Chinese coast guard “escorts,” restrictions on shipping insurance, interference with critical infrastructure, and economic retaliation against individual European states. The objective would not be to predetermine every possible scenario or response, but to prevent the first days of a crisis from being consumed by arguments over terminology and definition.
More concretely, such preparation also needs to extend beyond the level of governments by including shipping companies, insurers, ports, banks, technology firms, and semiconductor manufacturers—actors who would make decisions before diplomats reached an agreement. This would also have a plus side: European governments will be more willing to support collective measures if they know that the costs of Chinese retaliation will not fall disproportionately on one or two vulnerable countries. None of this would require Europe to adopt Washington’s China policy or promise military intervention in a Taiwan conflict. The goal, instead, is agreement in advance about which forms of coercion would cross a line, what economic measures could be considered, and how their costs could be shared. The United States has spent years strengthening military deterrence around Taiwan, yet the next Taiwan crisis may not begin with an invasion but with a disagreement over what to call what is happening. Washington’s task, therefore, is not to lament Europe’s fragmentation or demand that it simply follow the American lead, but to work with European governments now to overcome the structural obstacles that could turn hesitation into paralysis when a Taiwan crisis comes.
