Over the past twenty-five years, the United States has been engaged in three major regional conflicts: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. The nation has been at war for more than 20 of those 25 years, yet none of these interventions have unfolded as U.S. presidents originally promised. The recurring pattern reveals a significant disconnect between the application of raw military power and the achievement of stable, lasting political results.
Reflecting on the historical timeline, President George W. Bush declared in 2001 that the Taliban regime was coming to an end. A decade later, in 2011, President Barack Obama stated that the end of the war in Iraq reflected a larger transition, claiming the tide of war was receding. More recently, President Donald Trump described the Iran war as a tremendous military success. In each of these three conflicts, the U.S. military unleashed overwhelming power that effectively weakened or ousted the enemy during the initial phases of fighting. However, this capacity to break things and eliminate adversaries has consistently failed to translate into the fundamental political change that Washington sought.
Peter Bergen, a national security analyst at CNN and author of the new book "All The Presidents' Wars," which examines U.S. conflicts over the last quarter-century, argues that the U.S. keeps falling short when it comes to ending wars. According to Bergen, the United States generally does a good job of the inception of wars—breaking things and killing people—but fails to plan for the day after, which is the peace that follows the war. Paul Salem, with the Washington-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies, characterizes this approach as having an "imperial appetite but a tourist's approach."
Salem notes that this contradiction defined the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a similar scenario is currently playing out in Iran. He explains that the recent history of these regions is not one of stability and deep institutions where one can simply replace a leader at the top and expect everything to work out. Bergen reinforces this perspective, suggesting that the U.S. has been acting like an empire without actually wanting to be one. Empires typically require people to learn local languages and stay for long periods, rather than relying on short tours. Bergen notes that the U.S. is very reluctant to perform the tasks necessary to hold onto territories for a long time.
President Trump promised to keep the U.S. out of "forever wars," yet in attacking Iran, he is taking on the largest and most powerful U.S. rival in the region. The president is attempting to achieve this without the use of ground troops, which has successfully limited U.S. casualties. However, Douglas Lute, a retired Army lieutenant general, warns that while he does not support using ground troops, it is vital to recognize that without them, the U.S. must scale back its goals. Lute, who served as the "war czar" coordinating efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan under both Presidents Bush and Obama, argues that when the U.S. launches only a bombing campaign while retaining maximalist goals like regime change, there is no prospect for success unless the military is simply lucky. He emphasizes that being lucky is not a sound place to start a military campaign.
Trump has, at various times, called for eliminating Iran's nuclear program, toppling the government, and destroying its air force, navy, and missile program. Lute sees clear parallels between these current goals and earlier wars, noting that there have been repeated disconnects between ends, ways, and means, as well as a lack of sufficient understanding of what the U.S. was getting into. Furthermore, Paul Salem observes that for all its muscle, U.S. military power has its limits, and diplomacy has largely been sidelined. He notes that advice from the State Department has been brushed aside as too weak, and there is barely any State Department input or advice in the current war.
Lute identifies the Gulf War as the last time the U.S. really had realistic objectives. As an Army major in a cavalry unit during that conflict, he participated in a swift, decisive ground campaign with admittedly limited objectives, such as liberating Kuwait, rather than taking on Baghdad, overthrowing Saddam, or replacing the Iraqi government. While President Trump is looking to end the Iran war, Paul Salem believes that however this conflict concludes, it will not be the final word. He suggests that the U.S. is capable of striking Iran whenever it wishes, but while Iran will be vulnerable, it remains able to inflict a cost on the global economy and, indirectly, on the U.S. president. Salem concludes that there will likely be future wars and confrontations, and it remains unclear how the current conflict will end.
MYRE: …And President Trump just a few days ago.
