Long considered one of the most permissive environments for foreign intelligence operatives in the democratic world, Japan is currently undergoing its most significant postwar security transformation. The government, led by Sanae Takaichi, is aggressively expanding its counterintelligence and surveillance capabilities in response to growing concerns that the nation has become a hub for Russian intelligence activities.
Reports indicate that Japan has become a primary location for Russian operatives seeking to procure technology for the Kremlin’s war effort in Ukraine, particularly after many were expelled from Western nations. A 2022 Nikkei Business report estimated that approximately 120 Russian intelligence officers were active in Japan, with police noting efforts to cultivate employees at domestic technology firms. A notable instance occurred in January, when Tokyo police identified a machine-tool company employee disclosing trade secrets to a suspected SVR operative. A July 12 report from the New York Times further highlighted claims that a Tokyo office of the Russian state-owned airline Aeroflot was being utilized for technology procurement operations.
Historically, Japan’s legal framework has hampered efforts to curb these activities. The postwar constitution, rooted in a reaction against wartime suppression, prioritizes communication privacy and freedom of expression, leaving the country without comprehensive anti-espionage legislation. A 1985 attempt to introduce an anti-spy act failed due to public backlash, and while the 2013 Specially Designated Secrets Act introduced penalties for leaking state secrets, it has proven difficult to apply to foreign intelligence operations.
Despite a long-held perception that Japan lacked significant spying capabilities, leaked documents from whistleblower Edward Snowden revealed that the Directorate for Signals Intelligence (DFS) has operated in close collaboration with the US National Security Agency (NSA) since the 1950s. Investigations by NHK and the Intercept in 2017 and 2018 identified at least six surveillance facilities staffed by roughly 1,700 personnel. Based in a nondescript building known as C1 within the Ichigaya defense compound, the agency reports directly to the prime minister. The US has maintained a deep partnership with the DFS, providing training and technology like the XKeyscore surveillance system, while also funding major monitoring stations in locations like Okinawa.
To address current geopolitical threats, the government passed the National Intelligence Council Establishment Act in May. This legislation creates a prime minister-chaired council and a 700-member National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) designed to consolidate previously fragmented operations. Furthermore, officials are planning to propose new legislation targeting foreign operatives by the end of 2026, with the most significant development being the planned launch of a dedicated foreign intelligence agency by early 2028.
The Specially Designated Secrets Act also faced opposition but was passed by the Diet – Japan’s parliament – in 2013. Its harshest measure was 10 years’ imprisonment for leaking state secrets. The January case of the Russian operative cultivating a machine-tool engineer exposed its weakness when the police referred it
It had been widely believed, both at home and abroad, that postwar Japan had no significant spying capabilities or intelligence agency. However, documents leaked by the whistleblower Edward Snowden – who had been a National Security Agency (NSA) contractor at a US military base in Japan from 2009 to 2012 – revealed tha
