A series of recent fatal attacks highlights how political violence in Bangladesh continues to claim lives regardless of which party or coalition holds national authority. On the night of October 18, men chased Ripon Mia through Paiska in Narayanganj district before attacking him with sharp weapons. His family rushed him to a hospital, where doctors pronounced him dead. Ripon was a local leader of Jubo Dal, the youth wing of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). According to local BNP activists, his killing stemmed from an escalating rivalry between two internal groups over whose names should be included on a religious event's guest list, a dispute described by the local BNP president as a struggle for political dominance. His daughter Shila recounted the attack, stating that several men chased her father and hacked him.
The incident in Narayanganj follows earlier fatal clashes this year. On February 28, supporters of the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) fought in the western district of Chuadanga after an argument broke out following the evening meal to break the Ramadan fast. Hafizur Rahman died hours after the clash, while his brother Mofizur Rahman, a local JI leader, died on March 10 at a Dhaka hospital. Both parties traded blame for the altercation. Police subsequently arrested three suspects after the family lodged a murder complaint, including a local BNP official and a former leader of the party's volunteer wing. The violence occurred less than two weeks after the BNP returned to government.
Records compiled by the Bangladeshi human rights organization Ain o Salish Kendra (ASK), alongside news reports and academic studies, show that these incidents are part of a pattern of political violence spanning more than two decades. Between January and September of 2026, ASK recorded 94 deaths and 3,587 injuries across 467 incidents of political violence. Factional infighting within the BNP accounted for 112 of those clashes, resulting in 18 deaths and 1,215 injuries. These figures cover both the post-uprising interim administration and the elected government that took office after BNP chief Tarique Rahman assumed the role of prime minister on February 17.
Bangladesh has undergone massive political shifts in recent years, including the summer 2024 uprising that ended Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule on August 5, 2024. That transition was followed by a non-politician interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus and later by national elections. However, human rights documentation indicates that localized clashes over political control, local offices, party positions, land, and commercial operations have persisted through every administration.
Data extending back to 2002 illustrates that deadly disputes occur between rival parties, within ruling parties, and during electoral cycles. During the 2002–2006 period under a BNP-led government, ASK logged 284 internal BNP clashes resulting in 55 deaths, alongside internal Awami League (AL) clashes that caused 37 deaths, as cited in political scientist Rounaq Jahan’s 2014 study "Political Parties in Bangladesh." Although JI was a junior coalition partner holding two cabinet seats in the BNP government from 2001 to 2006, the formal alliance did not prevent violence between their supporters. ASK recorded 134 clashes between the BNP and JI during that period, leaving eight dead, while AL-JI clashes led to seven deaths across 42 incidents. Direct clashes between the AL and BNP caused 118 deaths during those five years.
During the military-backed caretaker government of 2007–2008, recorded party clashes dropped sharply under emergency regulations. Internal BNP clashes fell to eight with two deaths, while internal AL clashes dropped to one incident with no deaths. Clashes between the AL and BNP dropped to 32 incidents with seven deaths, contributing to a total of nine political violence deaths over those two years. However, Human Rights Watch documented that the reduction in party clashes was accompanied by emergency restrictions, arbitrary arrests, torture, and custodial killings by state authorities.
Following the Awami League's return to power in 2009, internal factional clashes escalated once again. Between 2009 and 2012, ASK documented 799 internal AL clashes resulting in 97 deaths, while internal BNP clashes totaled 229 incidents and 21 deaths. While local disputes remained frequent, national political confrontations generated significantly higher casualties. In 2013, amidst widespread political friction ahead of a disputed national election, ASK recorded 507 deaths from political violence. That total included 185 deaths linked to hartal (strike) violence and 85 deaths during blockades that began on November 26.
Confrontations involving JI, its student wing Shibir, and police forces were prominent in the 2013 records. ASK listed 37 deaths in clashes involving JI, Shibir, and police, plus 11 deaths in separate JI-police confrontations. Combined with other recorded incidents—including 13 deaths in AL-JI-Shibir clashes, nine in AL-JI clashes, nine in Shibir-police clashes, and five in AL-BNP-JI-police clashes—categories involving JI or Shibir accounted for 96 of the 507 deaths that year. In subsequent years, separately categorized incidents involving JI and Shibir decreased sharply, with nine incidents and three deaths in 2015, two incidents and one death in 2016, and one incident resulting in three injuries in 2017, before disappearing as standalone categories in the 2018 and 2019 annual tables.
Internal factional conflict remained deadly even in years without major national standoffs. In 2017, ASK recorded 52 political violence deaths, with internal AL clashes causing 29 of those deaths, excluding separate data for the party's student and youth organizations. Rural local council elections, known as union parishads, also served as major drivers of casualties. In 2016, violence surrounding union parishad elections accounted for 147 of the 177 political violence deaths recorded nationwide. Similarly, council election violence in 2021 resulted in 113 deaths out of 157 nationwide political casualties.
Human rights monitoring distinguishes routine factional violence from the larger casualty figures of state repression during national uprisings. A United Nations human rights investigation into the July–August 2024 unrest that ousted Sheikh Hasina estimated that up to 1,400 people were killed due to violent suppression policies by the former government, security services, and AL-linked groups. By contrast, ASK’s regular political violence tracking table recorded 100 routine deaths in 2024, maintaining a separate tally for protest movement casualties.
Following Hasina's departure, localized control over business and revenue streams shifted. On September 20, 2024, Zubayer Uddin Babu was stabbed to death in the Chandgaon area of Chattogram during a clash between rival BNP groups fighting over control of an artificial turf field. An investigation by Bangladeshi daily Prothom Alo into 15 incidents of violence and land grabbing in Chattogram found that local BNP members had taken over informal income networks, transport stands, markets, land, and railway contracts previously controlled by AL-affiliated figures during the interim administration led by Muhammad Yunus.
Internal BNP violence continued to rise prior to the party returning to national office. In 2025, ASK recorded 192 clashes between BNP factions that left 40 people dead, while eight died in internal Jubo Dal clashes, contributing to an overall total of 102 political violence deaths in 401 incidents that year. On March 8, 2025, Rafiqul Islam, a shopkeeper and former local BNP organizing secretary in Chuadanga, was killed in an internal BNP clash. His wife, Nahida Khatun, filed a case naming 36 people, including the union BNP president and general secretary, noting that after years of hiding from legal cases under the previous regime, her husband died at the hands of his own party members.
New political entities have also appeared in casualty reports. The National Citizen Party (NCP), established in February 2025 by student leaders from the 2024 uprising, was involved in nine recorded incidents in 2025 that left 171 people injured and five dead. Between January and September 2026, ASK documented 29 incidents involving the NCP resulting in 220 injuries, predominantly from clashes with the BNP. Meanwhile, clashes between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami grew from 33 incidents (three dead, 520 injured) in 2025 to 137 incidents (10 dead, 1,054 injured) in the first nine months of 2026. Additionally, 51 deaths were categorized under "Attack and Shoot by Miscreants" during that same period in 2026.
In response to ongoing political unrest, Prime Minister Tarique Rahman warned party members at an October parliamentary meeting against extortion and land grabbing, stating that lawmakers would face accountability. Police officials, including Chattogram's police commissioner, stated that law enforcement officers are executing arrests and filing cases regardless of political affiliation, though media reports noted instances where internal party expulsions or committee dissolutions were used in place of formal legal proceedings.
Academic research highlights the structural roots of this continuous conflict. Political scientist M. Moniruzzaman noted in a 2009 study published in South Asian Survey, titled "Party Politics and Political Violence in Bangladesh: Issues, Manifestation and Consequences," that political violence in the country operates as a cyclical mechanism. Clashes deepen partisan hostility and impede political compromise, leading ruling governments to use state apparatuses against rivals, who then respond with street agitation. The study observed that repeated reliance on physical force conditions student and labor wings to normalize violence, weakening democratic norms such as accountability, tolerance, and respect for opposition views.
