The Ministry of Defense in Japan recently published its 2026 Defense of Japan white paper, drawing renewed focus to China's rapid advancements in artificial intelligence and their broader consequences for regional security. While much of the global focus remains on conventional military systems, a more immediate threat is emerging in the digital sphere. Generative AI is rapidly lowering the technical and linguistic barriers that previously hindered Chinese information operations targeting Japanese society.
Historically, the unique complexities of the Japanese language and culture served as a natural barrier against foreign influence campaigns. Disinformation efforts originating from China were often easy to spot, marked by obvious grammatical errors, unnatural phrasing, simplified Chinese characters mixed with Japanese text, and visual glitches in AI-generated images. However, research by organizations such as the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and OpenAI indicates that these traditional weaknesses are fast disappearing as China-linked operators leverage generative AI to seamlessly adapt to Japan's online ecosystem.
A major escalation in these activities occurred following comments made in the Diet in late 2025 by Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae, who connected a potential Taiwan contingency directly to Japan's national security. Since those remarks, disinformation targeting Japanese political figures and domestic policy has surged in both scale and sophistication. These operations have not only attacked Prime Minister Takaichi personally but have also attempted to deepen domestic divisions. For instance, narratives have been spread linking Japan's increased defense spending to a supposed decline in social welfare, arguing that military expansion is being funded at the expense of ordinary citizens.
Evidence of this evolving threat continues to mount. In February, a report by OpenAI revealed that China-aligned actors used ChatGPT to plan and execute an online influence campaign targeting Takaichi. Meanwhile, the Sankei Shimbun has continued to track "PAPERWALL," a China-linked information network comprising 15 websites designed to look like authentic Japanese news outlets. The persistence of PAPERWALL highlights a highly localized, sophisticated approach where improved language, realistic imagery, and fake news layouts make it incredibly difficult for everyday readers to identify fabricated sources.
Generative AI has fundamentally changed the economics of cross-language information warfare. Previously, executing a large-scale campaign tailored to a Japanese audience required a costly team of translators, graphic designers, social media managers, and cultural experts. Today, large language models allow operators to correct grammatical errors, adjust tone, generate high-quality images, and spin multiple variations of a single narrative within minutes. This shift has made China's information operations highly scalable, rapid, and deeply localized.
In confronting this threat, Japan can look to the experience of Taiwan. Facing persistent Chinese influence operations for years, Taiwan shares a Chinese-language environment with the mainland, meaning Beijing never faced the same linguistic barriers there. To survive, Taiwan had to develop robust social mechanisms to counter large-scale disinformation and networks of suspicious accounts. This defense does not rely solely on government agencies or professional fact-checkers; it involves individual internet users identifying and blocking suspicious accounts, alongside continuous monitoring by civil society organizations and independent researchers.
Furthermore, language and culture remain vital defense mechanisms. Despite sharing a written language, Taiwan and China have distinct differences in vocabulary, grammar, and lived experience that AI cannot easily replicate. Japan possesses a similar, highly contextual linguistic and social culture. Even with advanced AI translation, foreign operators struggle to master the subtle political and linguistic nuances that exist across different generations, regions, and social groups in Japan.
Rather than relying on a reactive model that waits for fake news to appear before fact-checking it, Japan must proactively strengthen its society's resilience against coordinated influence campaigns before they gain momentum. To achieve this, information-security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan should become institutionalized. By deepening bilateral exchanges on detecting deepfakes, identifying coordinated bot networks, analyzing foreign influence operations, and monitoring digital environments during major crises or elections, both nations can build a more resilient regional information ecosystem.
