During the Russia-Kazakhstan Forum of Interregional Cooperation held in Omsk on July 24-25, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev publicly suggested that Russian President Vladimir Putin should consider freezing the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Tokayev proposed a return to the “Istanbul 2.0 formula,” referencing diplomatic talks held in Turkey in March 2022 and May 2025. While acknowledging that Russia and Ukraine maintain divergent positions, Tokayev argued that stopping the hostilities would benefit both nations, stating, “what’s happening, in my firm opinion, plays into the hands and delights of the adversaries of both Russia and Ukraine.”
Despite this push for peace, Tokayev explicitly rejected the role of a mediator for Kazakhstan. He stated on July 25 that he would not serve in such a capacity, asserting that Russia is a great nation capable of managing its own affairs. Tokayev emphasized that his comments were made because he was asked to convey the sentiment by others. Throughout his address, the Kazakh leader balanced his call for a ceasefire with a strong commitment to the strategic alliance between Kazakhstan and Russia, describing the relationship as essential regardless of current challenges.
The response from the Kremlin was immediate and unfavorable. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the proposal, stating that “a freeze as such is impossible” and emphasizing that Russia must achieve its stated goals in the conflict. Shortly after these remarks, it was revealed that Vladimir Putin had signed executive orders authorizing the Russian government to negotiate updates to long-standing military-technical cooperation agreements with both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. These agreements, dating back to 2013 and 2016 respectively, have not been updated since their inception.
While the connection between the peace proposal and the renegotiation of military agreements remains unclear, the backdrop of the war in Ukraine has significantly impacted regional dynamics. You have reached the limit of 2 free articles this month. Western sanctions have complicated the export of goods, including dual-use technology, between Russia and its Central Asian neighbors. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain heavily reliant on Russian and Soviet-era military platforms. Reports from the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs highlight that Uzbekistan, in particular, lacks the domestic capacity to produce sufficient ammunition and supplies to maintain its forces, leaving it dependent on Russia. In other conflicts, such as Syria circa 2017, Kazakhstan has offered itself up as a mediator or a neutral venue. As these nations navigate the complex geopolitical landscape, the ongoing conflict continues to serve as a significant stress test for their diplomatic and military ties with Moscow.
That first round of talks in Istanbul in 2022, as Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko wrote in a 2024 article for Foreign Affairs, could have ended the war – but didn’t.
Soon after Tokayaev’s comments, The Insider reported that two executive orders had been published via Moscow’s official legal information portal authorizing the Russian government to pursue negotiations with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan over their existing military-technical cooperation agreements: a December 24, 2013 agr
