Pakistan's military has accused the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) of meeting with other militant networks in Kandahar, Afghanistan, to coordinate operations against Pakistani security forces. According to Pakistani military spokesperson Lt. Gen. Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry, the meeting took place in August and was chaired by Mullah Shirleen, the Taliban-appointed governor of Kandahar.
The military spokesperson stated on October 1 that the BLA sought additional fighters from networks linked to Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a Pakistani militant leader based in North Waziristan. A separate intelligence report also identified figures associated with al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) at the meeting. According to that report, BLA representatives told participants that Pakistani military operations had left their group short of fighters and resources. In response, Afghan intelligence officials reportedly assured the BLA that fighters from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and AQIS could provide weapons, manpower, and logistical support. The intelligence document also alleged that Afghan and Indian intelligence officials helped organize the gathering.
Afghan officials have denied that the Kandahar meeting took place, and the allegations have not been independently verified. India has also consistently denied backing the BLA. Relations between Pakistan and the Taliban government remain openly hostile, characterized by frequent cross-border friction. In October 2025, fighting along the border killed dozens of people and nearly closed the crossing. Cross-border strikes resumed in February 2026 and have continued intermittently through September.
In response to alleged Taliban support for militant groups, Pakistan has recently escalated its military actions. Just hours before the military's October 1 briefing, Pakistan reported carrying out airstrikes in Afghanistan's Helmand and Kunar provinces. This followed earlier strikes on September 24 targeting ten locations across Kandahar, Paktia, and Khost provinces.
Despite the denials, a United Nations Security Council monitoring report published in August documented that BLA members have gained access to U.S.- and NATO-origin military equipment left behind in Afghanistan. This arsenal includes M4 and M16 rifles, reconnaissance drones, night-vision devices, and thermal equipment. The U.N. report also cited information from a member state indicating that BLA members have trained alongside TTP personnel at Afghan facilities, focusing on drone and urban warfare.
These evolving capabilities were demonstrated during the BLA's coordinated offensive on January 31, 2026, which featured simultaneous attacks across Balochistan, including in Quetta, Gwadar, Noshki, and Panjgur. A subsequent February assessment linked some of the weaponry used in these attacks—which included drones, satellite communications, and U.S.-made weapons—to equipment left in Afghanistan. While some of these items can be procured commercially or through other channels, such as Balochistan's western border with Iran, the U.N. report specifically highlights the Afghan training and equipment pipeline. In January 2024, Pakistan struck locations in Iran's Sistan-Baluchestan province targeting the BLA and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), though the BLF denied having hideouts there, and there is no evidence of Iranian arms supply.
Casualty figures from the January 2026 offensive remain unconfirmed. Pakistan’s military reported that 18 civilians and 15 security personnel were killed, while security forces killed 92 militants. Conversely, the BLA claimed it killed 84 security personnel.
Three key indicators are expected to clarify the extent of Afghanistan's role: independent verification of the Kandahar meeting, further U.N. monitoring of equipment and training links, and whether the BLA's use of drones and coordinated assaults expands beyond previously documented levels.
Analysts suggest that containing the BLA threat will require Pakistan to look beyond military options. A sustainable path forward would involve diplomatic engagement with Kabul to stop cross-border recruitment and training, improved border coordination, and addressing the security, economic, and political concerns of local Baloch communities to separate their grievances from armed exploitation.
