Recent incidents along the Naf River have exposed a critical vulnerability in Bangladesh's maritime security strategy, highlighting its unpreparedness for threats posed by non-state actors like the Arakan Army. Despite substantial investments in its naval capabilities, Dhaka's traditional focus on deterring state adversaries has left gaps in protecting its coastal waters from irregular incursions and the detention of fishermen.
Bangladesh's foreign policy has historically been guided by the maxim, “Friendship towards all, malice towards none,” a principle largely upheld at sea. In 2008, when Myanmar naval vessels escorted survey ships into disputed waters, Dhaka responded by deploying warships. However, Bangladesh ultimately pursued a legal resolution, successfully winning its maritime boundary case against Myanmar in 2012. Two years later, in 2014, it secured another victory against India in arbitration concerning their maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. These rulings provided Bangladesh with a legally secure maritime domain, a crucial asset it had lacked since independence, and a clear rationale for building a robust navy.
This led to the implementation of Forces Goal 2030, a plan that has significantly bolstered Bangladesh's naval power. Since 2009, more than 30 new warships have joined the fleet, alongside two refurbished Chinese submarines and a submarine base at Pekua, reportedly built for $1.21 billion. The strategic thinking behind this expansion, particularly after the 2008 standoff with Myanmar, was that the most probable maritime threat would come from another state's navy.
However, the most direct maritime threat to ordinary Bangladeshis has emerged from an unexpected source: the Arakan Army, a non-state actor. On August 8, the group detained three Bangladeshi fishermen near Shah Porir Dwip in Teknaf. Eleven days later, a Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) team received 24 other fishermen from the Arakan Army at the zero line of the Naf River; these individuals had been detained at various times since early 2025. According to BGB figures, between January 2025 and August 2026, the Arakan Army detained a total of 434 fishermen, comprising 222 Bangladeshi citizens and 212 Rohingya refugees living in Bangladesh. As of August 2026, 86 fishermen remained in their custody. Abdul Gani, a boat landing committee leader in Shah Porir Dwip, expressed the pervasive fear, stating, “Fishermen are always living in fear of the Arakan Army.”
While many abducted Bangladeshi fishermen had inadvertently entered Myanmar waters, which the BGB described as accidental incursions, the Arakan Army has also violated the border. In April 2025, the group operated within Bangladeshi waters, seizing 23 fishermen off Bangladesh’s Saint Martin’s Island. This incident forced 3,000 fishermen to remain ashore for five days.
Despite Bangladesh's substantial investment in its navy, driven by historical clashes with Myanmar, these incidents on the Naf River suggest that merely adding more warships will not resolve the current security challenge. The Arakan Army's use of fast boats in the shallow, unmarked waters of the Naf River renders submarines largely ineffective and deploying frigates for monitoring small boats in such an estuary an inefficient use of naval resources.
A more effective deployment of naval assets would involve regular patrols, reliable surveillance, and the capacity for rapid intervention against these unlawful activities. The solution requires accelerating the flow of information to authorities and establishing a clear chain of command for crisis response.
Under the Coast Guard Act of 2016, the Coast Guard holds the legal responsibility for monitoring coastal waters and protecting Bangladesh’s maritime boundary along the Naf River. However, agencies tasked with securing the Naf operate under separate chains of command. The Coast Guard falls under the Home Ministry, with its personnel seconded from the navy, which is part of the defense establishment. Compounding this issue, the BGB has taken the lead in securing the release of detained fishermen, effectively performing a role that should fall to the Coast Guard.
There is some optimism due to recent investments in the Coast Guard, even if potentially misdirected. Dhaka has announced plans to expand the Coast Guard’s manpower and is procuring patrol vessels and high-speed boats. Additionally, three surveillance drones have already been inducted. However, these capability enhancements do not address concerns raised by a serving naval officer in the Navy Journal in 2024, who described capability development among coastal security agencies as piecemeal, often leading to “gap or duplication,” and noted that ministries hold data “yet to be integrated for sharing.” This fundamental problem of maintaining a common operational picture of the Naf and organizing a coordinated response when fishermen are detained remains unaddressed by new equipment alone.
Political motivations may also explain the uneven focus on capabilities. For instance, then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina commissioned two submarines in 2017 and inaugurated the Pekua base in 2023. Such projects are highly visible and politically rewarding, whereas a coastal radar network in Teknaf might attract less public interest and is harder to champion when responsibility and budgets are fragmented across multiple ministries.
Bangladesh still requires a strong navy to contain Myanmar’s naval capabilities. Nevertheless, as Forces Goal 2030 approaches its conclusion, Dhaka could consider reallocating resources among its various maritime authorities. The Coast Guard could be tasked with establishing a consistent presence in the estuary, while the navy and BGB could be mandated to share radar footage and intelligence through a mutually agreeable system, supported by sustainable budgets for patrolling and rapid response operations. One model proposed in the Navy Journal is a Maritime Information Coordination Centre, though the author acknowledges disagreements over which institution should lead it. For fishermen, more conspicuous boundary markers and inexpensive geolocators could help prevent accidental crossings, but such markings would need to span the entire boundary and would not deter deliberate incursions.
Improved capabilities alone will only partially address the issue. While surveillance can locate fishermen’s boats, Dhaka cannot prevent Arakan Army patrols from detaining them on the Myanmar side of the border. Consequently, Bangladesh’s “Friendship for all” policy must be applied flexibly, as Dhaka lacks conventional state-to-state channels for engaging with a non-state actor. A BGB commander has attributed a higher number of returning fishermen to “professional, cordial, and effective coordinated efforts,” implying that the Arakan Army ultimately dictates when fishermen are released. Ideally, Dhaka should aim to establish predictable rules of engagement, such as information sharing on arrests and clear criteria for fishermen’s release, without formally recognizing the Arakan Army. The International Crisis Group has recommended that Dhaka increase its engagement with the Arakan Army.
Considering these factors, now that Bangladesh has resolved its maritime disputes with both Myanmar and India through international courts, its subsequent maritime modernization strategy for strengthening the navy must account for developments on the Naf River since the Arakan Army seized control of the far bank. For the fishing communities of Teknaf, true success will be realized when fishermen can return safely to port without fear.
