India currently navigates one of the world's most difficult security environments, managing adversarial relationships with both Pakistan and China. While New Delhi maintains a conventional military edge over Islamabad, it faces a significantly more powerful rival in Beijing, which has repeatedly used force to shift the status quo along their disputed border. Since the 1962 border war, the two nations have experienced numerous military confrontations, most notably the 2017 Doklam standoff and the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes in 2020. Furthermore, reports that Beijing provided critical intelligence support to Islamabad during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict suggest that future regional crises may increasingly involve Chinese support for Pakistan.
Given this geopolitical reality, India must develop strategies to deter and, if necessary, confront Chinese aggression. Although India is working to modernize its military through the acquisition of advanced Western fighter jets and the development of indigenous capabilities, it remains conventionally weaker than China. India’s defense spending stands at $92 billion, which is just over one-quarter of Beijing’s budget. China currently holds a 3:1 advantage in airpower, and its naval modernization efforts continue to outpace those of India. However, New Delhi does not need to match China’s military capacity on a one-to-one basis to establish credible deterrence. The ongoing conflict in the Gulf has highlighted how asymmetric warfare can be used to disrupt global energy markets and impose significant costs on conventionally superior powers, as demonstrated by Iran’s ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
China faces a critical maritime vulnerability in the Strait of Malacca, which serves as the shortest sea route between the Middle East and East Asia. Nearly 80 percent of China’s total energy imports, valued at $312 billion, transit this chokepoint. While Beijing has invested in mitigating this "Malacca Dilemma," it remains deeply exposed. Alternative routes like the Sunda and Lombok straits involve higher fuel costs, increased travel times, and greater logistical complexity, while land-based routes linked to the Belt and Road Initiative are expensive and susceptible to political instability. Consequently, maintaining the openness of this sea lane remains a vital interest for China.
New Delhi could exploit this dependency by investing in a layered maritime-denial architecture. Because India controls the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it does not need to rely on expensive aircraft carriers to threaten shipping in the strait. Instead, India could deploy low-cost unmanned systems, similar to those used by Iran, to alter the cost-benefit calculus for Chinese vessels. Additionally, the use of inexpensive naval mines could complicate maritime access, as the psychological impact of a mined waterway can effectively deter vessels carrying high-value cargo. The Indian Navy’s submarines operating from the Bay of Bengal would further complicate the situation, forcing Beijing to dedicate significant resources to anti-submarine warfare.
India’s growing arsenal of anti-ship cruise missiles, including the BrahMos and new long-range hypersonic variants, would further strengthen this area-denial strategy. These assets could threaten Chinese ships from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands without placing expensive naval destroyers in harm’s way. To ensure this strategy is credible, New Delhi must integrate these assets through persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across the eastern Indian Ocean, alongside resilient command-and-control networks and regular military exercises. While India has expanded its individual military assets, it still lacks a coherent maritime-denial strategy for the Strait of Malacca. Strengthening the Andaman and Nicobar Command with credible military capabilities is essential, though this should be treated as a distinct effort from commercial initiatives like the Great Nicobar Island Project. By focusing on these maritime-denial capabilities, India can ensure that any future Chinese aggression carries economic and military costs that Beijing cannot ignore.
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