China is expanding its influence operations across the Indo-Pacific, now specifically targeting digital spaces that operate in smaller languages. This strategic shift is largely enabled by recent advancements in generative artificial intelligence (AI), which dismantle traditional language barriers by allowing for natural-sounding manipulation without requiring proficiency in local languages. The use of AI-driven bot accounts also facilitates large-scale social media posting and sharing, a task previously reliant on manual effort.
The growing threat of foreign influence operations, particularly from China, is impacting not only the Indo-Pacific but also other digital environments that extend beyond major languages like English and French. While Russian influence operations targeting elections have been documented in Western countries since approximately 2015, Chinese operations in the Indo-Pacific have been noted since the 2020s.
Evidence of these operations has emerged in several countries. In Japan, disinformation circulated on social media platform X during the House of Representatives election in February 2026. Posts systematically promoted narratives such as “Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae is a militarist” and “Japan cannot win in a Taiwan contingency.” These posts exhibited traces of simplified Chinese in their text, featured meme images similar to those used by Chinese government-affiliated media, and aligned with Chinese government talking points, indicating a coordinated Chinese influence operation.
Taiwan has also experienced significant Chinese disinformation campaigns, including during the 2018 and 2022 local elections. In the 2024 presidential election, disinformation specifically targeted Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) members who were perceived as distancing themselves from China. In the United States, President Donald Trump cited Chinese influence operations targeting the 2020 presidential election during a press conference on July 16, 2026. U.S. intelligence documents released the same day corroborated these claims, concluding that China had conducted operations ahead of the 2020 election to damage public opinion of the Trump administration and undermine Washington’s international reputation. Australia has observed Chinese influence operations in its politics since the mid-2010s, with these efforts extending into digital disinformation during the 2025 general election.
More recently, Chinese influence operations have expanded to new targets. In the Philippines, a nation with ongoing territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, security authorities reported that China-supported groups conducted influence operations during the 2025 midterm and local elections. This prompted President Ferdinand Marcos Jr to order a detailed investigation, amidst concerns that China might intensify these efforts before the 2028 presidential election to secure a victory for a pro-China candidate.
Chinese influence operations have also become increasingly prominent across South Pacific island countries. During the Solomon Islands’ 2024 general election, disinformation spread claims that the United States was interfering in the vote. Since around 2023, allegations that Washington intends to assassinate the pro-China prime minister have been repeatedly circulated, suggesting a sustained campaign to foster anti-American sentiment.
Countering foreign influence operations in digital spaces is now a critical task for governments aiming to protect their democracies. While basic measures like monitoring digital linguistic environments, building fact-checking systems, and improving media literacy are necessary, they are often insufficient. Freezing accounts used by attackers typically requires cooperation from American social media platforms, but these large technology companies, whose revenues can surpass the GDP of smaller countries, often disregard requests from those nations. Therefore, governments targeted by influence operations must coordinate, amplify each other’s voices, and build international public opinion to pressure Big Tech into action. In the age of generative AI, such international cooperation is no longer optional.
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