China’s Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, which officially took effect on July 1, has sparked significant international scrutiny. Central to this concern is Article 63, which asserts that individuals and organizations outside the People’s Republic of China who are deemed to undermine ethnic unity or advocate for ethnic division may face legal repercussions. Critics argue that this provision serves to formalize Beijing's long-standing practice of exerting transnational pressure on diaspora communities, including Uyghurs and Tibetans.
The legislation represents a shift in Beijing’s approach to minority policy, moving away from the post-Cultural Revolution model of nominal ethnic autonomy toward a framework focused on “forging” a unified national consciousness. This concept, described by scholar James Leibold as involving the “casting and stabilization” of identity under state direction, aims to create a shared spiritual home for all ethnic groups. This objective is being integrated into the national education system, where schools are now required to use unified textbooks and emphasize the national common language and script. While the law mentions the protection of minority languages, it explicitly subordinates them to the national standard in public signage, publications, and institutional settings.
Economic and social integration serve as key pillars for this policy. Chapters 3 and 4 of the law detail mechanisms for “promoting exchange and integration” and “common prosperity.” The state is prioritizing interconnected community environments, including the development of population mobility platforms and cross-regional enrollment in higher education. These measures, when viewed alongside reports of coerced labor transfers involving Uyghurs, raise concerns that the policy aims to weaken cultural and linguistic barriers by placing minority populations into Han-dominated environments. This “developmentalist” approach treats economic modernization as a tool to cultivate “high-quality” citizens and dissolve distinct ethnic identities.
Furthermore, the law mandates that religious institutions must actively contribute to the development of a sense of community for the Chinese nation. You have reached the limit of 2 free articles this month. Article 46 requires religious organizations and venues to promote patriotic traditions and adhere to the “Sinicization of religion.” In practice, this means aligning religious beliefs with socialist values and restricting religious activity to administrative boundaries dictated by the Communist Party. By embedding these requirements into law, the state is transforming the management of ethnic and religious difference from a matter of accommodation into a project of national assimilation. This legislation provides a comprehensive legal framework for policies that have already been applied in Xinjiang and Tibet, now potentially extending across all officially recognized ethnic groups in China. Thus, the significance of the law lies not simply in its controversial extraterritorial reach, but in what it reveals about the trajectory of party rule under Xi. Ethnic difference is no longer treated as a feature of the PRC to be managed through limited autonomy but as an obstacle to national unity that must be transformed through law, ideology, and state power.
