China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) recently deployed large-scale naval and air forces around Taiwan and across the Western Pacific. Although Beijing has not formally announced any military exercise, the scale and geographical scope of these deployments have attracted significant international attention. In a report published on November 6, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) assessed that the PLA might be conducting a major, unannounced military exercise simulating the surrounding and isolation of Taiwan. Taiwanese media has dubbed these maneuvers a “silent military exercise.”
Taiwan’s National Security Council Secretary-General Joseph Wu stated on November 3 that more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels had been deployed across the Western Pacific. These operations involved three theater commands—the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Commands—and at least four major surface task groups, including the Liaoning aircraft carrier strike group. There were also indications that the aircraft carrier Fujian had departed its naval base in Sanya, Hainan. On November 2, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected 49 PLA military aircraft sorties, including 36 operating south of Taiwan, possibly in coordination with the deployment of naval forces in distant waters.
The ISW-AEI report noted that the maneuvers last week were larger than the PLA’s “Justice Mission 2025 exercise around Taiwan.” With the Liaoning operating in the Western Pacific, the Fujian in the vicinity of the Bashi Channel, China Coast Guard vessels appearing in waters east of Taiwan, and additional naval vessels and military aircraft conducting joint combat readiness patrols, these activities could collectively create the appearance of an encirclement of Taiwan. However, looking at the exercise structure, the current activities are more likely to constitute long-distance naval deployments and joint command-and-control exercises involving naval forces from different theater commands, rather than an exercise specifically designed to blockade or isolate Taiwan. The PLA is practicing how to disperse its naval forces into smaller formations, evade surveillance and reconnaissance by the United States and neighboring countries, break through the First Island Chain, and deploy its forces into the Western Pacific.
One important issue is that naval fleets subordinate to the various theater commands may not necessarily know the full objectives of their deployments before setting sail. Instead, after reaching designated tactical positions, they may receive new operational orders from the joint operations command centers of their respective theater commands or the Central Military Commission (CMC). Regarding the intensive joint combat readiness patrols conducted during October and November, one possible major reason is the relatively frequent typhoons from summer through autumn this year, which may have affected the PLA Air Force’s ability to meet its required flight training hours. Therefore, the primary purpose of these activities may not be to retaliate against or respond to Taiwan, but rather to fulfill the PLA’s routine operational training requirements.
The most noteworthy aspect of these deployments is the coordinated operations of naval forces subordinate to the PLA’s three coastal theater commands, as well as the potential integration of three maritime forces: the PLA Navy, the China Coast Guard, and the maritime militia. Such coordination could transform the three separate theater commands into an integrated operational framework covering the First Island Chain. From a military perspective, the significance of this cross-theater integration is considerably greater than the strategic ambiguity created by Beijing’s decision not to formally announce the exercise. Even if the PLA disperses its naval forces and passes through multiple straits along the First Island Chain, these formations would remain subject to surveillance by American, Japanese, and Philippine forces. Moreover, from Taiwan’s perspective, closer defense coordination with the United States, Japan, and the Philippines—particularly through the geographical positions of Japan’s Yonaguni Island, Taiwan proper, and the Philippines’ Batanes Islands—could establish a coordinated defensive arrangement capable of placing PLA naval formations under pressure from both sides of the First Island Chain.
In summary, the so-called “silent military exercise” is more likely to represent a cross-theater, long-distance naval deployment led primarily by the PLA Navy as a single service. One important development to monitor is whether the aircraft carrier Fujian will rendezvous with the Liaoning and conduct dual-carrier exercises in the Western Pacific. Another significant indicator will be whether the Fujian, while sailing toward the Western Pacific, once again transits through one of the straits surrounding the Philippines, which could suggest that the PLA Navy is seeking to replicate its previous operational patterns around Japan in the waters surrounding the Philippines.
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