In the evolving landscape of modern warfare, the sheer quantity of weapons a country possesses is no longer the only decisive factor in an armed conflict. If a Taiwan crisis were to escalate into a protracted conflict, the central dilemma would be whether the United States is capable of replenishing its weapons and munitions at a pace adequate to sustain the war effort. While military planners often focus on counting ships, aircraft, and missile stockpiles, or calculating defense spending, these figures illuminate only part of what a geopolitical power needs to be combat-ready. Maintaining a sustained combat posture depends heavily on the companies that produce munitions, components, spare parts, and replacement equipment.
Understanding defense readiness requires looking beyond national military preparedness and keeping track of the production capabilities of industrial manufacturers. According to a CSIS assessment, China’s defense industrial base is built to operate under wartime conditions, while the U.S. base remains largely geared toward peacetime production. Being able to assess readiness at the manufacturer level and close any existing gaps will give the United States the strategic wartime advantage it seeks. China considers wartime industrial readiness a strategic priority, and its manufacturing scale could make the difference in a protracted conflict in the Asia-Pacific. A Taiwan contingency could include a blockade, sustained maritime operations, missile strikes, and loitering munitions, as well as attacks on supporting infrastructure. In this scenario, the United States and its allied forces would need to sustain their aircraft fleets, replenish missile stockpiles, repair ships, and maintain a logistics chain across a vast theater of operations. In 2024, CSIS estimated China’s shipbuilding capacity at roughly 230 times that of the United States, with China acquiring specific high-end weapons systems at five to six times the U.S. rate.
In response to a potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific, the Department of War requested a 13 percent increase in the 2026 defense budget in June 2025. This increase signals a U.S. industrial-military outlook aimed at deterring China’s ambitions. The increase prioritizes the growth and strengthening of U.S. naval power, investment in higher-performance fighter jets, an increase in stealth units capable of operating from existing aircraft carriers, initial investments in the “Golden Dome” for Taiwan, and investments focused on upgrading nuclear technology. However, it is crucial that U.S. lawmakers understand that defense spending is only one part of the equation. The fact that a company holds a defense contract does not mean it has the capacity to accelerate delivery times. Optimizing production often requires new facilities, specialized tooling, skilled workers, and an increase in raw-material suppliers. A 2025 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that none of the seven major U.S. shipbuilders it examined was in a position to meet the U.S. Navy’s ship delivery targets at the time, citing infrastructure and workforce constraints.
New ways of evaluating the companies that drive U.S. military power are emerging. DefenseWatch.org has introduced an index that currently scores 27 companies on a scale of 0 to 100, offering a more structured way to evaluate and rank U.S.-based defense manufacturers. The score is calibrated based on quarterly datasets fed into the algorithm from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), SEC filings, and notices from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Rather than analyzing the U.S. defense industrial base as a monolithic entity, the index provides a company-level framework that makes it easier to compare manufacturers’ wartime readiness. The index is not a definitive prediction of wartime performance, but rather a tool that helps structure comparisons and expose potential vulnerabilities. The DefenseWatch.org defense contractor tracking index serves as a practical response to the existing gap in manufacturing measurement.
The ability to surge defense production matters as much as, or more than, existing output. CSIS wargames of the Taiwan Strait illustrate the magnitude of the challenge. Across nearly two dozen iterations, U.S. forces typically expended more than 5,000 long-range missiles in three weeks. Replenishment, however, operates on a very different timeline: CSIS reported that producing a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) took nearly two years, while the U.S. budget for fiscal year 2023 proposed buying only 88. These figures expose the core problem: the U.S. industrial base is not prepared for a potential conflict with China. Key components for helping assess a manufacturer’s viability during a conflict include “Investment Quality,” “Domestic Contribution,” and “Adversary Exposure.” “Investment Quality” refers to the ability to assess how much capital is used to resolve production bottlenecks. “Domestic Contribution” refers to the extent to which a manufacturer can rely on locally sourced components and labor. “Adversary Exposure” refers to how exposed a manufacturer’s supply chains are to foreign inputs, including foreign government ownership or cyber vulnerabilities.
At the government level, manufacturer readiness analysis can shed light on where additional industrial investment or supplier diversification deserves attention. Defense planners could leverage the data to examine whether multiple programs depend on the same manufacturer or limited industrial input. Meanwhile, allies such as Japan and Australia could benefit from a clearer understanding of the industrial dependencies and resilience of their defense supply chains. Industrial readiness is a key component of military power. Deterrence depends not only on the military capabilities available to the United States at the outset of a conflict, but on the industrial capacity to sustain them. Measuring that capacity before a crisis arises is a strategic necessity.
Luis Márquez is a lawyer who graduated from the Universidad de los Andes in Venezuela. He holds a diploma in Strategic Intelligence Management, with a specialisation in Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), from the National Technological University of Argentina. He is currently studying Urban and Port Security at the same institution, further developing his expertise in intelligence, security analysis, and the protection of critical infrastructure.
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