The widespread deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on modern battlefields, from the Russia-Ukraine War to the conflict between the United States and Iran, has highlighted a persistent vulnerability for Central Asian nations: their deep-seated reliance on foreign military suppliers. Historically dependent on Russia for security, states in the region now risk swapping that relationship for a new dependency on Turkish and Iranian defense manufacturers. However, emerging local initiatives suggest a growing push toward domestic production and regional technological self-reliance.
The strategic shift became highly visible during the 2022 border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where Turkish-made Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drones played a prominent, widely publicized role. Following the hostilities, Bishkek moved to deepen its ties with Ankara, placing orders for advanced Aksungur and Akinci platforms from Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) and Baykar, respectively. These acquisitions added to Kyrgyzstan's existing inventory of Turkish TB2 and Anka platforms. While drones offer a far cheaper alternative to manned fighter jets, the financial burden remains substantial. Kyrgyz civil servants reportedly saw their salaries reduced to fund these high-tech acquisitions. Beyond the initial purchase price, the long-term costs of maintenance, ammunition, spare parts, and specialized sensors require continuous financial commitments, locking the purchasing state into a long-term relationship with its supplier.
This reliance raises critical questions about supply security, particularly given Turkey's unpredictable defense policies in recent years. As a NATO member, Turkey originally sought to acquire American F-35 fighter jets but was removed from the program after purchasing Russian S-400 air defense systems. Ankara is now reportedly attempting to resell those S-400 systems to the United Arab Emirates in an effort to rejoin the F-35 talks. For a country like Kyrgyzstan, such policy shifts introduce significant uncertainty regarding whether Turkey can reliably supply replacement parts and airframes during an active conflict.
A similar strategic lesson unfolded in Ukraine. In the early stages of the Russian invasion, Ukrainian forces relied heavily on imported inventory, including Chinese-made DJI Mavics, Turkish TB2s, and American Switchblades. However, Kyiv quickly realized the limits of foreign supply lines and relocated drone manufacturing inside its own borders. By bringing development closer to the frontlines, Ukraine was able to rapidly adapt its systems to counter-measures, electronic warfare, and the shifting realities of the airspace.
Further, the ongoing conflict between the U.S. and Iran has demonstrated that even advanced Western drones are highly vulnerable to modern anti-air systems. Despite operating in a relatively permissive environment compared to eastern Ukraine, the United States military has lost 45 MQ-9 Reaper tactical UAVs—representing approximately 25 percent of its entire fleet—since the start of its campaign. The immense cost and years required to replace these high-end systems have reportedly prompted the Pentagon to consider shifting to entirely different platforms.
In response to Kyrgyzstan's growing drone arsenal, Tajikistan sought its own foreign defense partner. In 2022, Dushanbe reached an agreement to establish a facility to assemble Iranian Ababil-2 drones on Tajik soil. The deal was finalized by Iranian Major General Mohammad Bagheri and Tajik Defense Minister Sherali Mirzo. However, the partnership faced immediate political disruptions: Bagheri was killed in an Israeli airstrike in 2025, and Mirzo was removed from his ministerial post that same year. Four years after the initial announcement, the assembly project has yielded minimal progress. Even if successful, manufacturing Iranian-designed military hardware carries severe geopolitical risks, including potential U.S. banking and dollar restrictions that could turn the venture into a financial and security liability.
Given these foreign policy pitfalls, Central Asian nations have a compelling incentive to develop domestic drone systems or license complete manufacturing processes. Unlike heavy armor, naval vessels, or manned aircraft, the development costs for tactical UAVs are relatively low, and the region's security needs are large enough to sustain local production lines. Furthermore, regional states already possess the academic and research foundations necessary to foster cooperative defense manufacturing.
In Kyrgyzstan, local private enterprise has begun stepping into this space. In May 2026, the Kyrgyz company Nanospace announced plans to establish a specialized UAV institute in Tash-Dobo, located just outside Bishkek. While the project is in its early stages, its goals include training operators and developing networking technologies to coordinate swarms of small drones. Such efforts could significantly bolster domestic air defense, surveillance, and research capabilities without relying on foreign technical assistance.
Central Asia's established role as an educational hub supports this technological transition. Students from across Eurasia regularly attend Kyrgyz institutions like the University of Central Asia and the American University of Central Asia. Similarly, Kazakhstan has developed into a major regional academic center, hosting over 30,000 international students. These students attend domestic institutions such as Al Farabi and Eurasian National University, as well as local branch campuses of international universities like Cardiff and Woosong. Preserving academic freedom in these institutions could allow regional governments to network human capital and technical expertise to support defense development.
Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has demonstrated its own technological progress. During an exhibition in the late summer of 2026, the Uzbek Center for Innovative Technologies showcased the Shunqor-8, a new drone interceptor designed as a low-cost alternative to traditional surface-to-air missile systems. Historically, the region has relied almost exclusively on Russian military exports for air defense. Even amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, which has strained Russia's military stockpiles, Kyrgyzstan recently demonstrated its Russian-supplied S-300PS and Tor-M2KM surface-to-air missile systems, while Tajikistan took delivery of similar Russian hardware.
These countries also remain integrated into the legacy Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Joint Air Defense System. While official statements in 2026 spoke of modernizing this joint system and integrating artificial intelligence, the actual volume of military hardware delivered by Russia is unlikely to suffice during a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. Because Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan already possess operational experience with joint-venture manufacturing lines, there is little practical reason for Central Asian states to continue importing complete UAV systems rather than manufacturing them locally under license.
While local factories are unlikely to compete globally in producing high-end components like advanced electro-optical or infrared sensors, they can easily build smaller first-person view (FPV) and tactical drones. These systems can utilize commercial cameras and localized navigation software mapped to the regional environment, removing dependency on a single foreign satellite network and preventing vendor lock-in.
Historical conflicts in the region, such as those in Rasht and the Ferghana Valley, showed that manned aircraft using unguided munitions were highly ineffective and suffered heavy casualties. Because the high cost of modern manned combat fleets remains prohibitive for most Central Asian states, domestic drones offer a practical alternative to reduce civilian casualties and limit reliance on external powers. Beyond direct military applications, shared regional drone capabilities could help address shared environmental and security challenges. These include monitoring water flow from melting glaciers, managing downstream water distribution, detecting smuggling across remote borders, and securing large-scale international events like the World Nomad Games.
Ultimately, Central Asian states do not need to rely on Russia, China, or other external powers to meet these challenges. By investing in joint regional education, training, and manufacturing today, governments in Astana, Tashkent, Bishkek, and Dushanbe can address local security threats collectively while dismantling foreign dependencies. Implementing these cooperative measures now is essential to securing the region from external threats before the next localized conflict begins.
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Third, regional states already have a start on the research, development, and manufacturing needed to make such cooperation a success. Finally, the opportunities of joint drone research and production could lead to increased security cooperation along borders and against transnational threats. Doing so will help to escape the pitfalls of learned incapacity. What’s key though is that local leaders invest in R&D domestically – not outsource solutions.
