On November 19, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is set to deliver its judgment in the case of The Gambia v. Myanmar. This highly anticipated decision arrives nearly a decade after the 2016-17 military clearance operations that displaced more than 700,000 Rohingya into Bangladesh. If the court determines that these actions constituted genocide, it would mark the first such ruling against a sovereign state. The Gambia has requested that the court mandate the safe return of the Rohingya, the restoration of their property, and the guarantee of their freedom of movement. However, these objectives face a significant obstacle: the current reality in northern Rakhine, where the Arakan Army (AA) has established a firm grip on power after displacing the junta in 2024. You have reached the limit of 3 free articles this month.
For the Rohingya currently residing in Rakhine, the AA has become the primary source of authority and, according to reports from the United Nations and Human Rights Watch, a source of intense pressure. The group has instituted a complex system of controls, including forced labor quotas, paid permits for village-to-village travel, and various targeted taxes on essential items such as homes, fishing nets, boats, cattle, and rice paddies. Satellite analysis indicates that the AA seized approximately 2,000 acres of land and is linked to the destruction of roughly 8,500 structures across 50 Rohingya villages in Buthidaung township throughout 2024. In the village of Hnget Thay, rice paddies have been replaced by a detention camp consisting of 120 gray buildings, strictly controlled by the AA. Furthermore, the group has reportedly installed non-Rohingya settlers in 11 formerly Rohingya-populated villages, forcing local laborers to construct the new homes and infrastructure.
These actions, whether or not they meet the legal threshold for genocide, constitute crimes against humanity, specifically persecution and deportation. The AA appears to be creating a coercive environment, with reports of officials informing Rohingya at meetings that families unable to meet recruitment or tax quotas must vacate Rakhine State. Since 2024, more than 155,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh, with many citing direct orders from AA fighters. One resident, Salamat Khan, reported that AA fighters told him his home was gone and he should go to the refugee camps in Bangladesh.
Because Bangladesh is a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the court maintains jurisdiction to investigate these deportations. Although the ICC’s investigation into Myanmar is nearing completion and the court faces U.S. sanctions, experts suggest that member states could push for the inclusion of the AA in the ongoing probe. The ICC confronted a similar defense in September. When it convicted Mahamat Said, a commander in the Seleka rebel coalition that had seized power in the Central African Republic, it acquitted him of war crimes because the fighting had ended – but convicted him of crimes against humanity committed in the territory the Seleka then controlled. The Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar is already scrutinizing the AA’s conduct, and proponents argue that including the group would be a logical extension of the current investigation into crimes against the Rohingya.
The Arakan Army defends its actions as necessary measures for security and war, claiming to adhere to international laws of war while blaming Rohingya groups for aligning with the junta. However, these controls disproportionately impact the Rohingya as a group, regardless of individual actions, and many of the land seizures occurred after active fighting subsided. While the AA’s abuses differ in scale from the military’s 2017 operations, their methods reflect long-standing patterns of systemic control. As the AA seeks international recognition and engages in talks with Bangladesh, external actors have a unique opportunity to leverage aid and recognition to demand improved conditions for the Rohingya. Until such systemic controls are lifted, any talk of safe return remains, for many, an empty promise.
Because Bangladesh is an ICC member, the ICC can investigate those deportations now. When it authorized the investigation in November 2019, its judges explicitly declined to limit the investigation to the 2016-17 operations or to the people named in the prosecutor’s request. Rather, their authorization covers any crime
But with the ICC under U.S. sanctions, no new prosecutor is expected until late 2027, and its Bangladesh/Myanmar investigation nearing completion, bringing the AA into it will take pressure and support from its member states, starting with the 11 that backed The Gambia’s case at the ICJ.
