China remains vulnerable to maritime disruption, yet its expanding regional reach is steadily increasing the political and military costs for any force attempting to exploit that weakness. In October 2026, the Liaoning carrier group transited the Basilan Strait toward the Celebes Sea, marking at least its second reported passage since December 2025. This deployment, which also included a transit through the Luzon Strait, highlights China’s ability to utilize alternative routes beyond the First Island Chain. According to CSIS analysis of Japanese observations, Chinese carriers Liaoning and Shandong spent a combined 58 days beyond the First Island Chain in 2025, a significant increase from 32 days in 2024.
For Beijing, these navigational options serve a broader strategic purpose. The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Sterett (DDG 104) transit the Strait of Malacca, July 16, 2025. By expanding its naval and air footprint, China creates more opportunities to impose costs on any coalition attempting to interrupt its energy supply. A blockade coalition would face the dual challenge of protecting its own trade and operations while simultaneously sustaining pressure on China. Surveillance remains a primary point of friction; for example, the BRP Sarangani, BRP Diego Silang, and BRP Emilio Jacinto were reported by USNI News to have shadowed the Liaoning. However, such local monitoring does not guarantee continuous coverage. Records from Japan’s Joint Staff and Philippine sources show gaps in tracking, suggesting that public records do not support an assumption of uninterrupted surveillance.
The burden of surveillance is further complicated by China’s regional activity. While the Philippine military focuses on counter-piracy and counterinsurgency in Mindanao, Chinese ships have been active in areas like the Sibutu Passage since 2019. If Philippine surveillance proves insufficient, the U.S. or its allies would need to commit additional assets, further straining forces already facing maintenance and readiness challenges. A 2025 Government Accountability Office review highlighted shortages in spare parts and qualified personnel, while an August 2026 report noted that maintenance delays cost active attack submarines over 15,000 operational days between 2016 and 2025. The July 2026 engineering casualty of the USS Benfold, which required towing to Subic Bay, serves as a recent example of these operational constraints. You have reached the limit of 3 free articles this month.
The sustainability of a blockade is also undermined by the economic dependencies of U.S. allies. Japan and South Korea rely heavily on energy imports through the Malacca Strait, and their participation in an interdiction effort would require guarantees that their own supplies remain secure. Furthermore, regional diplomatic alignment is not guaranteed. In April, Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan ruled out participation in efforts to close or interdict traffic in the neighborhood, emphasizing that Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are aligned in keeping the straits open. This stance challenges the assumption that existing security partnerships equate to support for maritime interdiction.
Ultimately, China’s regional presence forces planners to account for a much broader geographic scope. While China remains vulnerable in the Indian Ocean—where a 2020 Naval War College study identified limitations in logistics and antisubmarine warfare—its regional operations are effectively raising the cost of coercion. China nevertheless remains exposed beyond its immediate region. Peacetime transits do not demonstrate the ability to keep ships, aircraft, and replenishment vessels operating under attack. The Malacca dilemma, therefore, increasingly runs both ways. For the United States, the central challenge is determining whether a coalition can maintain selective interdiction long enough to shift Chinese calculations while absorbing the inevitable counterpressure against its own forces and exposed partners.
