The military conflict between Iran and the United States continues to create significant instability for global trade routes, particularly across the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea. Beyond immediate maritime risks, the war is actively threatening the future of land-based trade and connectivity across the Eurasian continent. With no ceasefire negotiations currently planned, U.S. President Donald Trump called for an “economic D-Day” against Iran on August 19; when Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent fleshed that threat out on August 24, the announcement consisted of a warning shot rather than any new immediate policy, yet the long-term viability of regional transport corridors remains in jeopardy.
Military developments have had direct consequences for critical infrastructure. Following a collapse of ceasefire efforts, U.S. forces launched missile strikes on July 8, which resulted in visible damage to the Agh Tekeh Khan railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran. This bridge is a vital link, serving as one of only 2 railroads connecting Iran to Turkmenistan. It functions as a key connector for the Iran-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan Railway and the eastern route of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Further strikes in early July impacted multiple bridges, a tunnel near the port of Bandar Abbas, and essential infrastructure, including a maritime traffic control tower at the port of Chabahar.
These disruptions affect decades of regional investment. Countries including India, Russia, and several Central Asian states have worked to develop the INSTC since 2000, while the TRACECA program and the Ashgabat Agreement were established to simplify trade across the region. Landlocked nations like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have invested heavily in Iranian rail and port access, viewing hubs like Bandar Abbas and Chabahar as essential gateways to global trade. The INSTC framework has evolved through various milestones, including key developments in 1993, 2009, and 2013.
Recent agreements, such as the June 28 deal for Kazakhstan to develop a terminal at Shahid Rajaee Port, are now facing delays. The 27-year agreement, with 2 years to build and 25 years to operate, is now stalled. Similarly, Uzbekistan’s plans to build infrastructure at Chabahar have been indefinitely paused due to the conflict. The risk of further attacks, combined with U.S. sanctions and a lack of waivers, has created a climate of uncertainty for international investors and regional partners.
In response to these risks, regional states are actively seeking alternate routes to bypass Iranian territory. Uzbekistan is participating in a feasibility study for the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trans-Afghan Railway Project, which is expected to conclude by the end of the year. Furthermore, Pakistani officials have engaged with Kazakh counterparts regarding the use of ports in Karachi, Qasim, and Gwadar to provide Central Asian states with more stable access to global markets. While these projects offer a potential long-term solution, they are costly—estimated between $4.6 billion and $7 billion—and will require at least five years to complete.
Despite the risks, Iranian routes remain geographically advantageous, offering faster and cheaper transit compared to traditional sea routes like the Suez Canal. However, the ongoing U.S. military and economic pressure is effectively disrupting Eurasian trade plans, forcing a strategic shift as countries weigh the immediate risks of the conflict against the long-term benefits of established Iranian corridors.
