In February 2026, Japan achieved a global milestone when it successfully and continuously retrieved rare-earth mud from a depth of 6,000 meters off Minamitorishima, transporting the mineral-rich sediment aboard a surface vessel. Located roughly 1,200 miles southeast of Tokyo, Minamitorishima represents Japan's easternmost territory. For a nation that relies on China for approximately 90 percent of its critical rare earth supply and suffered an export freeze from Beijing in 2010, the technical feat generated widespread national excitement as a major step toward resource independence.
However, research analysts and strategic experts argue that Tokyo’s aggressive push into deep-sea extraction is driven less by immediate resource economics than by political calculus. As a member of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the first nation to retrieve seabed mud from such extreme depths, Japan is positioned to influence the evolving maritime order. Yet analysts point out that the effort carries elements of a political performance, mirroring the competitive dynamics of the space race where countries strive to secure security advantages, assert regional dominance, and plant their flag before international rules are finalized.
A primary motivation behind the rush at Minamitorishima involves reinforcing Japan's claim of effective control over the expansive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) surrounding the island. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a recognized island generates a vast EEZ for its sovereign country, whereas a rock generates none. In past territorial disputes, China asserted that Okinotorishima—a remote Japanese reef-islet in the south—was merely a rock incapable of generating an EEZ due to a lack of sustained economic activity. By establishing a track record of active economic operations around Minamitorishima, Tokyo aims to demonstrate effective control to the international community and cement the island’s legal status.
Shigeru Tanaka, director of the Asia-Pacific Resource Center (PARC), noted that the Japanese government continues to resist international calls to delay commercial seabed mining until at least 2030. Tanaka argued that official motivations center on projecting economic viability on Minamitorishima, even though deep-sea mining remains economically unfeasible under current conditions. Tanaka stated that the government's push appears so far-fetched that its underlying political objective of asserting legal control is evident.
Minamitorishima is also becoming the focus of two other major national security and infrastructure proposals. The Japanese Ministry of Defense informed Ogasawara Village, which has administrative jurisdiction over the uninhabited island, of plans to begin missile launch drills starting next year. These training exercises, moving from the United States to Japan, will feature truck-mounted launchers firing missiles with effective ranges of 200 to 300 kilometers.
Additionally, in March 2026—just one month after the successful seabed extraction—the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) formally asked Ogasawara Village to accept preliminary steps toward selecting Minamitorishima as a final disposal site for Japan's high-level radioactive nuclear waste. Ogasawara Village Mayor Masaaki Shibuya consented to the initial literature survey in April 2026.
As a result, three major initiatives of national significance—rare-earth mining, missile training drills, and high-level nuclear waste disposal—are set to converge on a single uninhabited island. Mayor Shibuya expressed caution regarding attempts to link the projects, explaining that the Cabinet Office presented the rare-earth mining project while METI introduced the nuclear waste survey. Shibuya maintained that based on official briefings, the initiatives are presented and handled as completely separate matters.
Despite official reassurances, local representatives have raised concerns over administrative coordination and security risks. Ogasawara Village Council Member Masashi Miyagi noted that when he inquired with METI, which oversees geological disposal, and NUMO, the agency managing national security risks, both bodies responded that national defense was outside their jurisdiction. Critics warn that placing a nuclear waste repository and an active missile range on the same remote island could make Minamitorishima an appealing target for foreign adversaries, while demonstrating a lack of unified government oversight.
Observing the situation from Guam, Senator William Parkinson of the Guam Legislature characterized the administrative approach as reflecting a logic of the frontier. Parkinson warned that while Minamitorishima’s remote, uninhabited status makes it convenient for government planners in Tokyo, being uninhabited does not mean the island is ecologically empty or disconnected from the broader Pacific community.
Strategic considerations also extend to international alliances and naval rivalry with Beijing. During a Japan-U.S. summit in March 2026, both governments reached an agreement on joint development of rare earths off Minamitorishima. Domestic reports indicated that the deal was intended to counter Chinese state-owned enterprises, which have expanded seabed exploration plans in international waters outside Japan’s EEZ near the island.
The joint announcement caught key scientists off guard. Hiroyuki Yamamoto of the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology (JAMSTEC) recalled his surprise at learning about the agreement through news reports, noting that he had only received an informal heads-up from a contact at the U.S. Department of the Interior. Yamamoto described the high-profile diplomatic announcement as likely being more of a political stunt than a technical decision.
Expert observers highlight that alternative diplomatic mechanisms exist to address Chinese activity in high seas near Japan. Tanaka pointed out that China's exploration vessels operate in international high seas without establishing a monopoly, suggesting Japan could either obtain ISA exploration licenses for high-seas areas adjacent to its EEZ or register formal objections as an ISA Council member.
Geopolitical researcher Tom Hale of the University of Delaware traced the origins of Washington and Tokyo's rare-earth strategy back to the 2010 territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Hale referenced METI’s 2024 Marine Energy and Mineral Resources Development Plan, which framed local seabed resource extraction as vital for national self-sufficiency and insulation from geopolitical risks.
However, Hale cautioned against a growing paradox in resource securitization. Framing critical minerals strictly as national security emergencies creates an artificial sense of urgency that restricts scientific evaluation and limits diplomatic options. Hale emphasized that intense securitization reduces the time available to solve complex extraction and environmental challenges, whereas pursuing international diplomatic pathways and conflict de-escalation broadens options for sustainable resolution.
