Beijing’s Taiwan Reunification Drive Rooted in Nationalism, Regime Security

Published: November 16, 2026, 5:28 pm

Beijing's resolute pursuit of reunification with Taiwan is primarily driven by deep-seated nationalist sentiment and the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) imperative to secure its regime, rather than solely by strategic military advantages or control over Taiwan's advanced semiconductor industry. This perspective challenges prevailing views among observers, analysts, and policymakers in the United States, other Western countries, and the Asia-Pacific region, who have expressed heightened concerns about potential military action against Taiwan since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Taiwan is widely regarded as a significant global flashpoint, particularly as Beijing perceives the island moving increasingly toward independence under the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. Chinese leader Xi Jinping's increasingly assertive stance on cross-strait reunification has further intensified these international anxieties.

Many outside mainland China often attribute Beijing's motivations to the substantial strategic and security benefits reunification would offer. This includes breaking through security constraints imposed by the U.S. and its allies, extending China’s maritime defense perimeter, strengthening Beijing’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific, and enhancing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to project military power beyond the First Island Chain. Another frequently cited motivation, particularly by U.S. analysts, is the prospect of gaining control over Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor industry, especially its leading-edge chip manufacturing capabilities, which are crucial to the global supply chain and the ongoing China-U.S. technological competition.

However, achieving these material objectives would likely necessitate establishing direct control over Taiwan, most plausibly through a successful military invasion. This would also require the island's manufacturing capabilities to remain intact and operational post-invasion. The likelihood of Beijing resorting to military force, and the success of such an invasion, remain uncertain. As John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans noted, “invasion likely remains at the bottom of the list for China’s leaders when sizing up solutions to the ‘Taiwan problem.’” Peaceful reunification, the only other option to achieve these objectives, would require Taiwan to voluntarily agree to political incorporation under CCP rule, a scenario deemed highly implausible given the strong Taiwanese identity and deep resentment against Beijing’s authoritarian system.

Historical evidence further questions these material-interest explanations. In 2001, then-Chinese leader Jiang Zemin explicitly stated that, post-reunification, Taiwan could retain its political and economic systems, armed forces, and administer its domestic affairs without the deployment of PLA troops or mainland administrative personnel. This suggests that direct strategic and military control was not an indispensable objective of Beijing's reunification policy at that time.

Fundamentally, the CCP views reunification with Taiwan as a nationalist issue, deeply rooted in national sentiment, emotion, and pride. During a September 2, 1986, interview with CBS journalist Mike Wallace, Deng Xiaoping articulated this, explaining, “First of all, it is a national question, a question of national sentiments. All members of the Chinese nation want to see China reunified. The present state of division is contrary to our national will.”

For Beijing, Taiwan symbolizes the Chinese people’s painful historical memories and the “century of humiliation” endured from the 19th through the first half of the 20th century due to Western and Japanese colonial encroachment. Consequently, reunification is seen as an indispensable step to overcome this national trauma and an integral part of the nationalist mission to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by the mid-21st century. Within this nationalist framework, Taiwan is consistently identified as a “core interest,” a foreign policy principle that Beijing considers non-negotiable.

Moreover, reunification with Taiwan, alongside other core interests like state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national security, and economic development, is subordinate to Beijing’s paramount core interest: preserving China’s existing political system and the CCP’s monopoly on political power. All other core interests ultimately serve to advance the security and preservation of the communist regime, with both domestic and foreign policies fundamentally formulated to ensure this regime security.

As China’s economic growth has significantly slowed in recent years, Beijing can no longer rely on rapid economic expansion to the same extent for regime legitimacy as it did for nearly four decades following the late 1970s economic reforms. Consequently, Xi Jinping now places greater emphasis on reunification as a means of sustaining regime legitimacy and security through nationalist mobilization, particularly amidst mounting domestic economic and social difficulties.

This underlying political logic suggests that Beijing’s pursuit of reunification strengthens the Chinese communist regime. Although Beijing's push for a “one country, two systems” reunification appears offensive, the CCP’s proposed model is fundamentally defensive. It is designed to enhance the CCP’s legitimacy through reunification while using “two systems” as a political firewall to protect the communist regime from the potentially subversive influence of Taiwan’s democracy.

Ironically, if Taipei were to advocate reunification under a democratic political system based on Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, Beijing would face a political dilemma. On November 12, 2026, Xi Jinping, in a speech commemorating Sun Yat-sen’s 160th birthday, called for carrying forward Sun Yat-sen’s legacy and achieving complete national reunification as part of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. However, it remains an open question whether Beijing would accept cross-strait reunification under a democratic system if it jeopardized the CCP’s one-party rule. This crucial political logic of the Taiwan issue appears to receive insufficient attention from policymakers and analysts in both Washington and Taipei.

Photo: Collected