A significant debate is ongoing within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) regarding the suitability of its forum for discussing China, a topic that has seen European allies express considerable reluctance. This internal discussion unfolds as Beijing continues to view the alliance as an offensive Cold War relic, a perception NATO is urged to address despite finding it “strange and exaggerated.”
China's perspective on NATO has remained consistent for years, seeing the alliance as a Cold War remnant that should have dissolved after the Soviet Union's collapse, much like the Warsaw Pact. Beijing, mirroring Russia's stance, does not consider NATO a defensive alliance but rather an offensive entity that threatens global stability. This view is underpinned by examples such as NATO's successive eastward enlargements and its “out-of-area” interventions, including the accidental 1999 bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the intervention in the former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, China shares Moscow's belief that NATO's eastward expansions exert pressure on Russia by disregarding its security concerns, thus attributing blame to NATO for Moscow's “preemptive military actions,” such as those in Ukraine, which are seen as acts of self-defense.
The inclusion of China on NATO's agenda, first in 2019 and subsequently in the 2022 Strategic Concept, is interpreted by Beijing as a sign that the organization is preparing to expand into Asia or intends to establish an “Asian NATO.” Chinese analysts contend that Russia now serves as a crucial buffer zone between NATO and the Asia-Pacific region, without which NATO would already be present in Asia, posing a severe security threat to China. China also dismisses NATO's assertions that it has no intention of establishing a presence in Asia, arguing such a move would contradict the Washington Treaty. Similarly, Beijing does not accept explanations that freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) conducted by U.S., French, British, German, or other vessels in Asia are not NATO operations, often exploiting these national actions as political tools against the West by lumping them under the “NATO basket.”
The initiative to place China on NATO's agenda originated in the United States, notably during Donald Trump's first term as U.S. president. However, European allies have consistently shown reluctance to prioritize China within the NATO framework, citing three primary reasons. Firstly, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has underscored that Russia, not China, represents the immediate security threat to the alliance. Secondly, NATO's operations are geographically restricted by the Washington Treaty, with Article 6 specifically defining its area of activities as the “North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.” Thirdly, Europe largely perceives China as an economic challenge or threat rather than a direct hard security one, even when considering its support for Russia. It is also understood that the NATO Strategic Concept's classification of China as a “challenge” rather than a “threat” is largely due to European allies' efforts to moderate U.S. demands and diminish China's perceived importance to the alliance.
Critics argue that making China a central topic for NATO discussions would be counterproductive. Such a focus would inadvertently validate or reinforce Beijing's concerns, whether real or imagined, about the organization's expansion into Asia. Despite NATO's geographical limitations, China leverages its inclusion in the Strategic Concept to assert that the alliance is indeed expanding towards Asia and poses a genuine threat. Furthermore, continuing to discuss China within NATO is seen as a significant diversion of attention from the alliance's true and imminent threat: Russia. NATO, for its part, states it is only considering exchanging views with the “Indo-Pacific Four” (IP4) and other Asian countries on regional security, with a focus on issues like cyber. This was exemplified on January 22, 2026, when chiefs of defense from the United States, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea attended a session on “Partners in the Indo-Pacific” at the 194th NATO Military Committee in Chiefs of Defense session in Brussels, Belgium.
Instead of NATO, several other formats are suggested for discussing China as a hard security actor. The European Union is highlighted as a prime option for European countries, already engaging with China on economic challenges like deindustrialization and hard security issues, including adding Chinese companies to sanctions against Russia. Other viable platforms include bilateral and multilateral discussions such as transatlantic talks, engagements with ASEAN and its members, and the G7. It is proposed that continuing to discuss China in the NATO format risks deepening Beijing's negative perception, thereby limiting potential cooperation to mitigate threats to NATO from China's political allies like Russia, Iran, and and North Korea. A more constructive approach, it is argued, would involve regular dialogue with Beijing to try and soften its negative opinion of NATO, emphasizing that the alliance's existence benefits China by deterring Russia from initiating a catastrophic war with NATO allies.
